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Abstract 
Discrete choice modelling is concerned with the appropriate 
specification of choice between qualitative alternatives. Choice 
in this context means either deliberate action by some individual 
or planning agency or the selection of a certain alternative by 
social, political or economic forces in the course of evolutio-
nary processes. That latter concept is frequently evoked in the 
context of institutional choice, the transaction cost approach 
being just one although prominent approach to this problem. 
Discrete choice theory which is the theoretical underpinning 
of discrete choice modelling is firmly based on the principle of 
maximizing agents. At first sight, this seems to be contradictory 
to institutionalist thinking, since most of that literature is 
explicitly or implicitly rooted in the assumption of bounded 
rationality and satisficing behaviour. To reconcile these two 
approaches it is necessary to demonstrate that for many purposes 
full versus bounded rationality or, for that matter, maximizing 
versus satisficing behaviour are not so much apart as is somtimes 
asserted. Our contention is that by properly specifying the in-
formational and decisional background the gap between theses two 
approaches could be bridged. It will also be demonstrated that 
discrete choice theory, by avoiding aggregative thinking, is 
specifically apt to integrate the 'objective and subjective de-
terminants' of a choice problem into a single approach. This is 
the reason why discrete choice theory cou 1 d be of he 1 p in the 
analysis of institutional choice and design. 
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1. Introduction 
In a recent paper one of the organizers of this workshop ela-
borated on the problem of rationality in economics in general and 
instituional choice in particular (Badelt, 1987). Refering to 
Herbert A. Simon he argued that the behavioral assumption of 
satisficing suffices to tackle many economic questions aiming on 
qualitative statements. To quote the original text: "In these 
analyses aimed at explaining institutional structure, maximizing 
assumptions play a much less significant role than they typically 
do in the analysis of market equilibria. The rational man who 
sometimes prefers an employment contract to a sales contract need 
not be a maximizer. Even a satisficer will exhibit such a prefe-
rence whenever the difference in rewards between the two arrange-
ments is sufficiently large and evident." (Simon, 1978, p.6) 
Simon concludes: "Analysis can often be carried out without elab-
orate mathematical apparatus or marginal calculation. In general, 
much cruder and simpler arguments will suffice to demonstrate an 
inequality between two quantities than are required to show the 
conditions under which these quantities are equated at the mar-
gin" (ibid.) 
For someone who has devoted some time to understand formal 
models of choice between discrete alternatives these comments are 
quite striking. The latter strand of modelling, a fast growing 
branch over the last 10 to 15 years, aims at bringing choice 
between discrete alternatives to the same formal and "exact" 
level as the already familiar theory of (quantitative) consumer 
choice. It yields a methodology firmly based upon the principle 
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of maximization and uses a mathematical apparatus hardly to be 
considered crude and simple. In view of the remarks of Simon, is 
this mostly futile effort? 
The present paper is a result of the cognitive dissonances 
arousing in us by the fact that we are ardent supporters of dis-
crete choice analysis and at the same time sympathetic to an 
approach aiming at a more general view of economic behaviour and 
institutional change. One purpose of this paper is to discuss the 
concept of rationality as used in the institutional analysis 
literature. We contribute to an old discussion, originating in 
the marginalist debate of the fourties with Machlup and Friedman 
as the leading defenders of the orthodox approach (see e.g. 
Machlup (1946), Friedman (1956)). Our main argument is that many 
of the disputes around this point are not a matter of substance 
but form. As soon as maximizing behaviour is brought back to its 
informational and decision-making foundations many differences 
with the supposedly broader concepts of satisficing and bounded 
rationality disappear. 
It is a further aim of this paper to demonstrate that discrete 
choice analysis is a valuable instrument for an institutional 
economist, both in theoretical and empirical terms. Despite of 
its foundation in the concept of maximization discrete choice 
analysis can handle many phenomena considered central in insti-
tutional economics. It can even account for individuals limited 
competence in decision making in an empirical treatment of prob-
lems of institutional choice. Because of its close relationship 
to neoclassical consumer theory the discrete choice framework can 
help clarifying the relationship between neoclassical and insti-
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tutional economics and narrow the gap between these separate 
disciplines. 
The paper is organized into 5 parts. Section 2 discusses is-
sues of rationality. Section 3 presents some fragments of an 
economic theory of imperfect information. Section 4 briefly 
sketches discrete choice theory and illustrates its usefulness by 
an application to the choice of water supply in an African vil-
lage. Section 5 gives a summary. 
2. Rationality in institutional choice literature 
"Bounded rationality" and ''satisficing" are major theoretical 
concepts in institutional economics. In the 1 i terature they are 
used to contrast the neoclassical elements of "rational behavior" 
and ''maximization". The latter are felt to be too strong assump-
tions loading a much too heavy burden on the individual making 
some decision. "Satisficing" and "bounded rationality" it is 
argued are weaker requirements. They allow the individual to be 
pleased with something good enough and the decisionrnaker does not 
have to go for the very best. He can use some rule of thumb, 
apply common practice and imitate the behavior of other agents. 
Thus, it is argued, the behavioral basis of institutional econo-
mics is fundamentally different to the neoclassical one. 
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2.1. Rationality vs. bounded rationality 
Despite its central role in most of the respective literature 
the meaning of "bounded rationality" often remains unclear. Sub-
stantial definitions are rarely presented. A good example is 
Williamson (1985), where the concept of bounded rationality is 
made a cornerstone of the whole theory but the reader is never 
told in substance what is meant by it. Simon's definition, al-
though illustrative, lacks substance as well: "The capacity of 
the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is 
very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution 
is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world 
- or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective ratio-
nality." (Simon, 1957, p.198) 
Assumptions about individual behavior interfuse with the deci-
sion making context. Rationality is seen to subsume not only 
correct decision making but also perfect information (or rational 
expectations) and the existence of just one type of decision 
maker. Decision and environment often are mixed-up intentionally. 
In our view mixing these two elements brings about misinter-
pretations and deludes a dichotomy of theories which is actually 
not existing. A mor(~ precise theoretical foundation can be 
obtained by keeping the decision making process and the decision 
making environment conceptually separated. It is not "rationa-
lity" and "maximization" which are the crucial elements of 
orthodox neoclassical economics but the treatment of information 
and the modeling of the decision making environment. We do not 
see a real need for institutional economics to allow agents to 
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use the information they have available in a sloppy way. When 
information is costly and hard to get even the neoclassical homo 
economicus might use a successful rule of thumb or accept a 
satisficing alternative. 
We advocate to use the term "rationality" in economics just in 
the same way it is used in decision theory. (see e.q. Raiffa, 
1968) An individual behaves rational if it uses the available 
information in an optimal way, i.e. maximizes its objective func-
tion conditional on the information available. It has a strict a-
priori meaning and is solely a personal characteristic of the 
individual. An excellent illustration is provided by Richard 
Thaler. He comments on the famous billiard player example of 
Friedman and Savage (1948) by adding to their expert billiard 
player a novice and an intermediate player. "It is important to 
stress that both the novice and intermediate players described 
above behave rationally. They choose different shots than the 
expert does because they have different technologies." Thaler 
(1980, p.58). The only difference to our argument is that we 
substitute technology (skill) by information. 
Rational behavior in an uncertain environment also implies 
collecting the optimal amount of information. A choice has to be 
made about the sources to exploit and information should be ac-
quired as long as a net benefit can be expected. This is closely 
related to the decision one has to make. The cost of information 
can vary greatly not only by source of information but also by 
personal characteristics like education, age, experience, and all 
characteristics influencing the opportunity cost of time. So for 
some collecting further information might be worth the effort 
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while for others is might be not. Just like for the novice billi-
ard player it might not be worth all the practicing to become an 
expert player. 
Although important the argument we presented above is not new 
at all. It has been discussed in the literature for some time. 
Williamson for example comments on it in the following way: "It 
is sometimes argued that bounded rationality is merely a convolu-
ted way of stating that information is costly. Once this has been 
acknowledged, maximizing modes of analysis can deal with all of 
this issues with which bounded rationality is concerned. There is 
something to be said for this: As Simon observes, a large 'plot 
of common ground is shared by optimizing and satisficing analy-
sis'. Although one might, on ground of parsimony, recommend that 
'we prefer the posulate that men are reasonable to the postulate 
that men are supremly rational when either one of these 
assumptions will do' it is easy to understand how others can 
decide differently. Working within an neoclassical framework is 
not a benefit that will be sacrificed lightly." (Williamson, 
1985, p.46, fn) 
For Nelson and Winter, however, fundamental tensions remain: 
"There is a fundamental difference between a situation in which a 
decision maker is uncertain about the state X and a situation in 
which the decision maker has not given any thought to whether X 
matters or not ... " {Nelson and Winter, 1982, p.67). 
This seems to be a rather extreme position. Even institutiona-
lists like Williamson feel uneasy about it. Nevertheless it does 
not contrast with the concept of maximization. To quote Stigler 
and Becker, two extreme defenders of neo-classical economics: 
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"The making of decisions is costly and not simply because it is 
an activity which some people find unpleasent. In order to make a 
decision one requires information, and the information must be 
analyzed. The costs of searching for information and of applying 
the information to a new situation are such that habit is often a 
more efficient way to deal with moderate or temporary changes in 
the environment than would be a full, apperently utility-maximi-
zing decision" (Stigler und Becker (1977), p. 82). Stigler and 
Becker are here arguing about the individual whereas Nelson and 
Winter's research object is the firm. But replace the word 
"habit" by "routine" in the above quotation and in our view there 
remains no fundamental difference between the positions of 
Stigler/Becker and Nelson/Winter. The argument of Stigler and 
Becker is that looking for better alternatives is only worth 
while when the (expected) utility gain exceeds the costs of 
information gathering and processing. This clearly includes 
looking for alternatives of which the decision maker is not yet 
aware. 
When observing these obvious parallels in some of the more 
recent literature bounded rationality appears to be more a re-
search strategy than a substantial departure from behavioral 
assumptions. Its main purpose seems to be that by stressing this 
behavior it is possible to advance to research fields not treated 
before. 
What is lost, however, by substituting strict maximization by 
the weaker concept is a clear demarkation between different stra-
tegies. Nelson and Winter for example fail to show how individu-
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als determine the balance between information gathering and the 
use of routines. 
2.2. The concept of satisficing and optimal search theory 
It is illustrative to compare optimal search theory to the 
institutionalist concept of "satisficing". The latter is often 
viewed as a weaker and therefore more realistic substitute for 
the maximization postulate and as a challenge to neoclassical 
theorizing. When viewed in the light of less than perfect infor-
mation, however, the dichotomy vanishes completely. What first 
appeared to be a fundamental behavioral difference turns out to 
result from a difference in the amount of information available 
to the decisionmaker. In both cases the decisionmaker tries to 
make the best out of the situation. 
However, the situation is fundamentally different. In an envi-
ronment of "full information" choosing the action which gives the 
optimal result is trivial. Since the outcomes of all actions are 
known beforehand the one giving the maximum result is well iden-
tified. When there is less than full information the possible 
actions have to be investigated. The decisionmaker has to spend 
scarce resources to 1 earn about the outcome of an action. This 
establishes a trade-off between the costs of further investiga-
tion and the return which can be expected from these actions. A 
decisionmaker aiming to maximize the return will investigate any 
further actions only if the best action at hand gives a return 
below a certain threshold, namely the net expected return of the 
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actions not yet investigated. The decisionmaker maximizes his 
return by applying "satisficing behavior". 
This is a well known result in the optimal search literature 
(see e.g. Lippman and McCall, 1976; 1979). The standard search 
model assumes that the decisionmaker knows the search cost and 
the distribution by which the returns are generated. When there 
is an infinite number of alternatives, i.e. search is unlimited, 
the individual's optimal strategy is to set a reservation value 
and to accept the first alternative exceeding it. In other words, 
he searches for a satisficing alternative. It is important to 
note that this strategy maximizes the decisionmaker's expected 
return. 
Although this model has been modified in numerous ways its 
basic concept remains rather simplistic. When compared to the way 
how "satisficing" is used in institutional economics, however, it 
has one basic advantage: The search model is able to tell us when 
an alternative is satisficing since the reservation value is 
determined within the mode 1. Because of its re 1 uctance to an 
optimization mechanism the institutional framework cannot provide 
this information. 
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3. Rational behavior and imperfect information 
The information concept of the basic search model assuming the 
decisionmaker has perfect information about the distribution is 
rather strange. When doing empirical work no economist ever did 
know a distribution perfectly. All he ever had was a sample of 
observations and parameter estimates. As a matter of fact, in a 
model like the standard search model we assume the decisionmaker 
to be better informed than we have ever been or will ever be. 
Nevertheless, assumptions of "perfect information" or "perfect 
knowledge of some distribution" are more than common in econo-
mics. Many economists, although fully aware that there is nothing 
like a free lunch, seem to be convinced that there is a 
inquiry-office for anything. 
free 
More reasonable is the assumption that the decisionmaker too 
gets information from observations. In a search context this 
means that to each alternative there is information attached 
about the distribution. So the decisionmaker not only decides 
whether to accept an alternative or not but also incorporates the 
new information into his believes about the distribution or col-
lects information to improve the basis for his decision. These 
activities again are guided by the attempt to increase net bene-
fit, i.e. to maximize some objective function. 
The standard economic concepts of full information and perfect 
information about some distribution appear exotic in this con-
cept. Since the marginal return of additional information de-
creases with the amount of information at hand nobody will ever 
attempt to reach the state of perfect knowledge as long as infor-
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mation is not completely costless (in terms of money, time, ef-
fort, etc.). Going for full knowledge is simply irrational. In a 
model like this information becomes of crucial importance (Maier, 
1985). The decisionmaker has to decide about the amout of infor-
mation to collect as the basis for a specific decision. This 
decision, in turn, has to be based upon the individual's a-priori 
knowledge. The decisions made in such an environment will coin-
cide with the rational/full-information behavior of neoclassical 
economic theory only by chance. Deviations will result from dif-
ferences in a-priori knowledge, information cost, and other as-
pects we will discuss below. But even small deviations might 
result in substantial distortions of prices and other aggregate 
parameters (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985) and often there is little 
hope that the market forces are able to eliminate the deviations. 
(Russel and Thaler, 1985) 
Information costs are an important factor, particularly if we 
consider that they are not exogenously given. In migration theory 
the beaten path phenomenon is well known. It describes the obser-
vation that links with large migration flows in the past tend to 
have large flows in the future. Past migrants are a cheap source 
of information for those staying behind thus lowering the infor-
mation cost for just one possible destination. A-priori knowledge 
might be the result of the information transmitted by media and 
is therefore likely to reflect their orientation in terms of 
subject, space or social stratum. Mental maps describing our 
habitat quite precisely but other areas only vaguely seem to 
exist not only in geographical space but also in social and eco-
no:r:i c space. Our a-priori kn owl edge is less accurate for dee i-
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sions we need to make only rarely and since we are not used to 
deal with it even information costs will tend to be higher in 
these fields. 
These phenomena can bring about systematic imbalances. In some 
markets actors on the supply and demand side interact with syste-
matically different frequency. A good example is the labor mar-
ket, where individual workers on the supply side usually face 
personnel managers on the demand side. The latter are specialized 
in labor market transactions. They frequently hire personnel and 
thus accumulate a lot more knowledge about wage distributions and 
other labor market related aspects than an individual worker. If 
some external changes occur personnel managers can divide the 
information cost required to learn about the new situation to 
more transactions. Due to this fixed-cost-degression they will 
react by acquiring more information faster than the suppliers of 
labor. Even if during time this information leakes to all agents 
in the market there is some considerable period where demand is 
in a superior position over supply. Moreover, it should not be 
overlooked that the information about the outcomes of all these 
biased transactions leakes as well. This will enlarge the period 
of market distortion. 
The weaker side of the market has one important strategy it 
can apply, namely to collaborate. Labor forms unions and other 
institutions which can among other obligations transfer informa-
tion to their members e.g. in form of collective wage agreements. 
Although the existence of many institutions is related to 
information they are not necessarily formed in reaction to market 
imbalances. In many cases they are simply marketplaces for infor-
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mation. Take for example scientific journals. Without them it 
would be very delicate to distribute our excellent scientific 
findings to the many potentially interested colleagues around the 
world. Everyone of us would have to maintain a huge archive of 
addresses and spend an enormous amount of money sending out pa-
pers. It is much more efficient to have a journal. Those writing 
articles know where to submit them and those demanding the infor-
mation know where to look it up. The editors dont have to care 
too much about the addresses since the users subscribe to the 
journal and they even pay for it. However, institutions like that 
are not neutral. There is usually a "policy of the journal", 
which favors one type of research and disfavors some other. When 
the journal is of particular importance in the discipline, the 
editor's policy will influence the discipline's future develop-
ment. 
Once established institutions have the potential to structure 
the market. They can filter information, specialize on some spe-
cific area (in terms of content and space) or favor one side of 
the market. Even when biased in one way or the other they are not 
necessarily challenged by competing institutions, since establi-
shing a new institution requires cooperation from both sides of 
the market. 
As already mentioned the application of habit, routine, imita-
tion, use of rules of thumb, which are usually considered irra-
tional can be clearly rational in an environment with incomplete 
and costly information. In many cases it might not be smart to 
use up a lot of resources to accumulate enough information for a 
sound decision. When the consequences an individual has to expect 
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from a 'wrong' decision arc just minor probably the best thing to 
do is to trust the decisionrnaking competence of others and to 
follow the crowd or to apply some simple guidlines. Another rea-
son for such behavior might be the fact that the respective de-
cision is made so rarely that no fixed cost degression applies 
and information gathering therefore turns out to be too expen-
sive. 
When the same decision has to be made repeatedly, however, it 
can become a routine. A lot of information has been accumulated 
and the behavior deduced from it has turned out to be successful. 
As long as the environment does not change there is no need to 
acquire more information. The marginal cost are higher than the 
marginal return, not just marginally but considerably due to the 
information which can be deduced from the successful application 
of the routine in the past. So, even when the routine fails there 
is no immediate need to revise it. Since the decisionmaker does 
not have perfect information about any distribution but draws 
samples this can just be an outlier. It is is even rational to 
carry on the routine until there is substantive evidence for a 
change in the environment. 
The phenomena sketched in this section have one thing in com-
mon. They all indicate that the decision making environment is a 
crucia 1 factor in indi vidua 1 decision making. It consists of a-
priori knowledge, information cost, past experience ("routines") 
as well as the individual's socioeconomic background, macro para-
meters, etc. Many of these factors vary greatly over individuals. 
Their influence cannot be captured by any models dealing with 
"average" or "identical" individuals. 
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By assuming perfect information - either about parameters or 
about their distribution - standard neoclassical economics elimi-
nates these factors from its theories. Probably this is even the 
main purpose of this assumption. As already stated above, we 
think that this is the element in neoclassical economics which 
brings about most of the results particularly institutionalist 
economists feel uneasy with. The rationality assumption, it ap-
pears to us, came under attack by accident. 
Dropping the assumption of perfect information has the advan-
tage that statistical theory and the concept of sampling in par-
ticular provide a well defined alternative. The institutionalist 
concepts of "bounded rationality" and ''satisficing'' on the other 
hand appear to be still quite vaguely defined substitutes to the 
assumption of individual rationality. 
4. Discrete choice theory 
The discrete choice methodology fits the general framework we 
have outlined above. On the one hand it builds upon the assump-
tion of utility maximization while on the other it is able to 
take into account heterogeneities in the decision making environ-
ment. In principle all of the effects we have discussed above can 
be captured by a discrete choice model. 
It is important to distinguish discrete choice theory, which 
comprises a decision making rationale, from the statistical me-
chanics. The latter can be used just as a regression analogy for 
discrete data without using any behavioral foundation. An example 
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of this strategy can be found in the paper by Burton A. Weisbrod 
presented in this workshop. 
Static discrete choice theory is derived from the following 
setup (see e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985): 
Suppose an individual is faced with the problem of choosing 
from a finite set of discrete alternatives. We denote the indivi-
dual by the subscript n and his choice set by Cn. The alterna-
tives cannot be combined arbitrarily and he can choose just one. 
Following the tradition of Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974) the 
alternatives are described by their characteristics. Xin is the 
vector of characteristics describing alternative i for individual 
n. The individual we describe by a vector of socioeconomic cha-
racteristics Zn- It is a basic assumption of discrete choice 
theory that the individual can assign a utility measure to each 
alternative according to the following indirect utility function. 
( 1) 
Vis a function of the characteristics of alternatives, socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the individual, and a vector of unknown 
parameters. It represents that part of the evaluation which can 
be attributed to Xin and Zn- sis a random component. It makes U 
a random variable as well. 
There are two interpretations for the randomness of utility 
(Domencich and McFadden, 1975). One originates from the psycholo-
gical literature (for an overview see Luce and Suppes, 1965) 
arguing that individuals are unable to recognize all relevant 
characteristics and to properly assign a uti 1 i ty index. Random-
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ness of utility results from the limited abilities of the indivi-
dual. The economic interpretation on the other hand preserves the 
concept of deterministic utility maximization at the level of the 
individual but admits that "the analyst does not have the capabi-
lity of 'peeping into the head' of each individual and fully 
observing the set of influencing factors and hence the complete 
decision calculus, making it necessary to assign a probability to 
any event selection" (Hensher and Johnson, 1981, p.30). In this 
interpretation randomness of utility results from the limited 
abi 1 i ties of the analyst. In practica 1 terms four major sources 
of randomness are identifiable (Manski, 1973; Ben-Akiva and Ler-
man, 1985) 
1. unobserved attributes, 
2. unobserved taste variations, 
3. measurement errors and imperfect information, 
4. instrumental (or proxy) variables. 
Treating utility as a random variable has some remarkable conse-
quences: 
1. because of the stochastic element in the utility function 
discrete choice models can be applied directly. Other than in 
the empirical application of most other economic models, where 
a disturbance is added to a deterministic model, randomness is 
already part of the theory. Theoretical results are not de-
rived by pretending a deterministic environment. 
2. The deterministic model is a special case of the stochastic 
one. The former is derived from assuming a degenerate dis-
tribution for c. 
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It is important to note that discrete choice theory uses an 
ordinal concept of utility just as consumer theory. Any order-
preserving transformation may be applied to Uin· 
We assume the individual to maximize utility. He will choose 
that alternative from Cn which provides the maximum value utili-
ty. However, since utility is a random variable all the analyst 
can make is a probability statement. 
( 2) 
Here Pin denotes the probability that individual n chooses 
alternative i. Because of the assumption of utility maximization 
this probability is equal to the probability that the utility of 
alternative i is the largest. 
Different classes of discrete choice models can be derived 
from different distributional assumptions for s. The two most 
important are that the s are independent identically Gumbe 1 and 
multivariate normally distributed leading to the logit and probit 
model respectively. While in the binary case these two models 
give almost identical results (Amemiya, 1981, Horowitz, 1980), in 
the multinomial case where there are more than two alternatives 
they differ considerably (see e.g. Daganzo, 1979). 
Information about the characteristics of the alternatives, 
socioeconomic characteristics of the individual, and the choices 
of the individuals is sufficient for estimating the unknown para-
meters. Usually maximum 1 ike 1 ihood methods are ap;:.i 1 ied for this 
purpose. 
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The general framework can be expanded to dynamic modeling as 
well (see e.g. Heckman, 1981, Wrigley, 1986). Some of the factors 
we have discussed yield temporal interdependencies in decision 
making (e.g. "routines") . To obtain reasonable results a model 
has to take into account this dynamic component. 
A highly flexible structure for dynamic discrete choice models 
was introduced by James Heckman. He substitutes equation (1) by a 
much more general utility function (for details see Heckman, 
1981) which accounts for current and past characteristics of the 
alternatives and socioeconomic characteristics of the individual, 
past decisions (structural state dependence), the most recent 
spell of identical decisions, and the cumulative effect of past 
evaluations (habit persistence). For a specific application one 
usually has to make some simplifying assumptions. But even then a 
model of this type causes some subtile problems. What is needed 
are data for different time periods with individuals being iden-
tifiable over time (panel data). Estimation easily becomes quite 
cumbersome often requiring time consuming computational methods 
like numerical integration. 
Discrete choice seems to be a suitable methodology for the 
empirical analysis of a number of institutional choice problems 
because of the following features. 
1. Its explicit purpose is the modeling of choice problems with a 
finite number of discrete alternatives. This general type of 
problem corresponds to a number of institutional choice deci-
sions. 
2. Discrete choice theory is micro-oriented. It allows to take 
into account the heterogeneity of the population in terms of 
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socioeconomic characteristics and individual specific diffe-
rences in the characteristics of alternatives. Dynamic models 
allow for phenomena like state dependence and habit persi-
tence. 
3. The model has a sound behavioral basis rooted in economic 
decision theory. It also provides a close link to search mo-
dels as we have discussed them above (Maier and Rogerson, 
1986; Lerman and Mahmassani, 1985). 
4.1. An application to the choice of water source 
In this subsection we want to illustrate the usefulness of the 
discrete choice methodology in an institutional choice context. 
The example is taken from some work of Dale Whittington and Xin-
ming Mu from the Deptartment of City and Regional Planning, Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. We are greatful for the 
permission to use their work in this paper. 
The discrete choice model we will refer here is actually a by-
product of an attempt to calculate the value of time spent col-
lecting water in an African village. The data have been collected 
in Ukunda, Kenya. 
This study is particularly suited for our purpose for two 
reasons. First it models the choice between different institutio-
nal settings. The alternatives for water supply taken into ac-
count in the study are 
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a) open well; water is supplied free of charge but has to be 
carried home a long distance (10-30 minutes). Well water is 
considered to have a bad taste. 
b) kiosk; water is sold at kiosks but they are usually located 
closer to the residents. 
c) vendor; this is the source with the highest price. However, 
"almost anywhere in Ukunda a person can step out of his house 
and hail a vendor" (Whittington and Mu, 1987, p.8). 
The second reason why the study is particularly suited for our 
context is the fact that it applies this methodology to a third 
world country, where - according to some common stereotype - the 
concept of rationality applies least. 
Whittington and Mu use the following data structure for a 
single household: 
Vendor 
Kiosk 
Wel 1 
1 
0 
J33 J34 
TIMEDv CASHDv 
TIMEDk CASHDk 
TIMEDw CASHDw 
J35 
0 
0 
TASTE 
J36 
WOMEN 
0 
0 
67 
0 
0 
EDUCT 
f3 8 
VINCM 
0 
0 
B9 
0 
KINCM 
0 
The first two variables, named VENDR and KIOSK in the next table, 
are alternative specific constants measuring the autonomous uti-
lity of the respective alternative not captured by the other 
variables. TIMED is the total time spent collecting water per 
day, CASHD the total amount of money paid for collecting the 
water per day. The indices refer to the alternatives. TASTE is a 
dummy variable indicating the household's perception of the taste 
of water from the open wells. It is one if the taste is consi-
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dered poor, zero otherwise. WOMEN gives the number of adult women 
in the household, EDUCT the number of years of formal education 
of the head of household. VINCM and KINCM both give the house-
hold's income. They are used alternative specific for vendor and 
kiosk allowing for differences in the choice behavior of higher 
income households. 
Whittington and Mu applied a (static) multinomial logit model. 
The results of estimation can be found in table 1. 
Table 1. Results of Estimation 
Var. Coe££. std.err. t-ratio 
VENDR -1. 84 2.08 -0.88 
KIOSK -3.61 1. 91 -1. 89 
TIMED -0.055 0.017 -3.13 
CASHD -0.13 0.042 -2.21 
TASTE -4.06 1.63 -2.49 
WOMEN -0.90 0.55 -1. 63 
EDUCT -0.17 0.083 -2.12 
VINCM 0.029 0.053 0.54 
KINCM 0.002 0.048 0.05 
Log-Likelihood Ratio: 
Restricted Log-Likelihood Ratio 
Likelihood Ratio Index 
Chi-Squared 
Significance Level 
Number of observations 
Source: Whittington and Mu, 1987, p.23 
sign.level 
0.38 
0.06 
0.002 
0.001 
0.013 
0.10 
0.034 
0.59 
0.96 
-41.5 
-75.8 
.58 
68.5 
0.322 E-13 
69 
The over a 11 mode 1 is highly significant. Despite the fact that 
only 69 observations are available. This illustrates that with a 
discrete choice model one can obtain reasonable results even from 
small samples. "The signs of all of the explanatory variables are 
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as expected. The variables for collection time, money cost, 
taste, and education are all significant at the 5% level." 
(Whittington and Mu, 1987, p.16) For illustrative purpose let us 
run briefly through the interpretation of their parameters. Col-
lection time (TIMED) and money cost (CASHD) are both generic 
variables. Their coefficients tell us that an increase in TIMED 
as well as an increase in CASHD for one alternative would lower 
the probability of being chosen as a source of water. From the 
ratio of these tv10 coefficients one can ea lcu late the va 1 ue of 
time which amounts to exactly the market wage rate for unskilled 
labor in Ukunda. The variable TASTE is used specific to the al-
ternative 'well'. So the negative coefficient tells us that fami-
lies considering well water to have poor taste choose this alter-
native with significantly lower probability. From the data avai-
lable nothing can be said about the validity of this opinion and 
where it originates from. It might be some routine resulting from 
a bad experience in the past or a simple rule of thumb. People 
with higner education (EDUCT) tend to avoid the open wells as 
well. They probably know more about health hazards originating 
from well water. 
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5. Summary 
This paper dealt with two interrelated subjects: it discussed 
the concepts of rationality and maximization as opposed to boun-
ded rationality and satisficing and investigated the usefulness 
of discrete choice in an institutional choice context. 
In the first part we contributed to an ongoing debate arguing 
that the difference between the two competing concepts is not so 
much a matter of substance but form. Instead of the rationality 
assumption the simplifying assumptions about information and the 
decision making environment in general should primarily be at-
tacked and weakened. The main reason is that the results are 
qualitatively identical but there is a well defined alternative 
only for the latter assumption. 
Some elements of an economic theory with perfect rationality 
but imperfect information are sketched in section 3. They indi-
cate that heterogeneity and the decision making environment are 
key elements. 
In section 4 we sketch discrete choice theory and argue that 
it is particularly suited to take into account heterogeneity and 
the decision making environment at the individual level. Dynamic 
versions can even account for temporal interdependencies between 
decisions. This makes discrete choice theory an interesting me-
thodology for empirically analysing problems of institutional 
choice. We illustrate this by presenting a static discrete choice 
model dealing with the choice of water source in a kenyan vil-
lage. 
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